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Abstract
Recent work has proposed the Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance (LZJD) as a method to measure the similarity between
binary byte sequences for malware classification. We propose and test LZJD’s effectiveness as a similarity digest hash for
digital forensics. To do so we develop a high performance Java implementation with the same command-line arguments
as sdhash, making it easy to integrate into existing work-flows. Our testing shows that LZJD is effective for this task,
and significantly outperforms sdhash and ssdeep in its ability to match related file fragments and files corrupted with
random noise. In addition, LZJD is up to 60x faster than sdhash at comparison time.
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1. Introduction
In forensic investigations of IT environments, there has
been a long recognized and ever increasing need to find
similar files for a number of scenarios, including file cluster-
ing, detecting blacklisted material, and finding embedded
objects [1]. Initial triage and screening of data can easily
enter terabytes of data, collected from email archives, hard
drives, USB peripherals, and network traffic[2]. Such needs
occur in many other areas as well, such as firmware analysis
[3] and malware triage[4, 5].
Finding similar files is often a daunting task, since man-
ual inspection can take hours per file, if possible at all. The
need to automate this task has led to the development of
many similarity digests or "hashes" [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Similar
to hash functions like MD5 or SHA1, these digests convert
an arbitrary string of bytes into a shorter identifying byte
string. However, whereas a hash function like MD5 is de-
signed to produce dramatically different output for even a
one byte change in the input, these similarity digests are
designed to produce little if any change in output given
a small change in input. By making the similarity hash
insensitive to changes in the input, we can compare the
hashes themselves as a method of comparing the similarity
of two files.
The two most popular and well known similarity hashes
[1] are ssdeep [9] and sdhash [11], which have become the
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standard benchmarks in the field. While ssdeep is often
ineffective for many data types, it is readily available and
one of the fastest hashing methods in use. In particular,
ssdeep is sensitive to byte ordering, which is a weakness
for formats that support arbitrary re-ordering of contents
(such as binary executable files). While sdhash is slower
than ssdeep, it makes up for runtime performance loss with
significantly improved matching and detection ability and
is considered state-of-the-art in this regard[1]. The sdhash
program’s improved matching and detection is the result
of resolving the byte reordering weakness of ssdeep.
While ssdeep and sdhash are popular fuzzy hashing
techniques, they have made a number of design or imple-
mentation choices that may not be suitable for all the files
types we may consider now or in the future. The ssdeep
algorithm uses a context triggered approach, and the con-
text itself is dependent both on file length and a minimum
block-size bmin, and a signature length S. Both of these are
set to constants without explanation on the determination
of these constants, or exploration of their impact. Ssdeep
also uses a weighted edit-distance to determine final match
scores, without explaining the determination or intuition
for the values of the weights[9]. The sdhash algorithm
similarly has a number of parameters which must be set,
and states they are determined empirically from some set
of data[11]. However, this data may not accurately reflect
the content of interest for practitioners at large, yet the
same parameters are now used — and no tool is provided
to re-calibrate such parameters to a desired data type of
interest. The scoring method used by sdhash also results in
the undesirable property that sim(A,B) 6= sim(B,A) [12].
It can also be difficult to interpret the exact score returned
by these methods. For example, Roussev and Quates [2]
recommends treating any score in the range of [21, 100] as
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"Strong" in terms of correlation. This covers 77% of all
possible values returned by sdhash.
In this work, we propose the recently developed Lempel-
Ziv Jaccard Distance (LZJD) [13] as an alternative similar-
ity digest. The LZJD was developed for malware analysis,
a related field that is particularly challenging due to the
arbitrary degrees of freedom available to a malware author.
LZJD’s success in the area of malware analysis suggests
that it may be a useful alternative to sdhash for digital
forensic investigations.
We will show four primary benefits of using LZJD as
a similarity digest. First, the time it takes to compare
two hashes is orders of magnitude faster with LZJD com-
pared to sdhash, which is critical when dealing with large
signature indexes. Second, the LZJD score can in prac-
tice be interpreted as a lower bound on how similar the
binary contents of two files are. This interoperability is not
present in current digest methods. Third, LZJD is better
at matching a file fragment with its source file (i.e., the
source file receives the highest matching score compared
to all other files) compared to both ssdeep and sdhash.
We suspect that LZJD sets a new state-of-the-art in this
regard. Fourth, the digest size of LZJD is fixed, making
the determination of index size trivial.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We will
introduce the reader to LZJD and its design in section 2.
In doing so we will give our interpretation of the LZJD
approach that leads us to believe it will make an effective
similarity digest. Since efficient execution time is critical
to tool adoption and use, we detail how we develop a faster
version of LZJD in section 3, and compare results to the
original LZJD work to confirm that our approach has no
loss in accuracy while obtaining higher throughput. These
tests will also include ssdeep and sdhash to show LZJD’s
superiority in a related domain, and a significant failure
case for sdhash. Given our new efficient LZJD, we evaluate
its abilities as a similarity digest in section 4 using the
FRASH framework[14]. We will discuss the meaning and
importance of our results in section 5, followed by our
conclusion in section 6.
2. Background, LZJD
The inspiration for LZJD comes from the Normalized
Compression Distance (NCD)[15]. The NCD is a metric
based on the Kolmogorov complexity function K(·), which
returns the length of the shortest possible computer pro-
gram that could produce a given input string. In measuring
the similarity between two byte strings a and b, if a has no
relationship to b then information about a will not allow
us to write a smaller program that produces b. Conversely,
if a and b are very similar, a program that produces a can
also produce b with only a small additional amount of code.
The amount of code needed to produce a and b together,
rather than independently, is used to measure the similarity
of the strings.
However, the Kolmogorov functionK(·) is uncomputable,
so an approximation must be used. For the NCD, it was
proposed to use any arbitrary compression function C(·),
which would return the length in bytes of the compressed
input. The resulting distance function is given in (1), where
xy indicates the concatenation of strings x and y.
NCD(x, y) =
C (xy)−min (C(x), C(y))
max (C(x), C(y))
(1)
Given the widespread availability of compression algo-
rithms, this NCD function is easy to implement in prac-
tice. Yet its execution time is hampered by the large
amount of time needed to perform compression. The ef-
fectiveness of the compression algorithm also has a direct
impact on the accuracy of NCD, and the most effective
compression schemes often have the greatest run-times. In
addition to this computational burden, NCD has a number
of practical issues despite theoretical assurances. It has
difficulty with high entropy strings, can produce values
larger than the theoretical maximum similarity of 1, and
lacks symmetry (which also breaks the distance metric
properties)[16, 17, 18]. All of these issues would not occur
if the Kolmogorov function K(·) could be computed, and
occur due to failures in approximating it with a compressor
C(·).
NCD did find use in the domain of malware analy-
sis, where it was found that Lempel–Ziv–Markov chain
Algorithm (LZMA) [19] based algorithms performed best
[20, 18]. The malware domain often has no obvious or
"best" features for general use, and the changing nature of
malware over time means that these features can change as
well. This makes a method like NCD useful in its flexibility,
since no features need to be specified or extracted, and it
can work on raw binary contents. However, the lackluster
runtime performance of LZMA in NCD limited its use to
around 10,000 datapoints or less.
Inspired by NCD, and noting that the LZMA com-
pression based schemes usually performed best, LZJD was
developed to circumvent the performance issues of NCD[13].
LZJD follows a simple process: First, LZJD converts a byte
string b into a set of sub-strings sb, using a simplified ver-
sion of the Lempel-Ziv 77 algorithm (LZ77) [21, 13]. This
simplified version of LZ77 is presented in Algorithm 1.
We review the details of the LZ77 approach used, as
they are important to both our interpretation of score
results and in improving the runtime performance of LZJD.
This method works by building a set of previously seen
strings from the given byte string b. The set starts out
empty, and a pointer starts at the beginning of the file
looking for a sub-strings of length one. If the pointer is
looking at a sub-string that has been seen before, we leave
it in place and increase the desired sub-string length by
one. If the pointer is at a sub-string that has not been seen
before, it is added to the set. Then the pointer is moved
to the next position after the sub-string, and the desired
sub-string length reset to one. Repeating this until no new
items can be added to the set, and return the constructed
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Algorithm 1 Simplified Lempel-Ziv Set[13]
1: procedure LZSet(Byte string b)
2: s← ∅
3: start← 0
4: end← 1
5: while end ≤ |b| do
6: bs ← b[start : end]
7: if bs 6∈ s then
8: s← s ∪ {bs}
9: start← end
10: end← end+ 1
11: return s
set. The strings in the set will get progressively longer as
the length of the input increases.
Once we have sets of sub-string for each binary of
interest, we measure the similarity of the two sets using
the Jaccard similarity (2), which will return a value in the
range of [0, 1]. The Jaccard similarity is also referred to as
the resemblance between two sets A and B.
J(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| (2)
However, this alone is not as fast as desired. So a
faster LZJDh was introduced[13] to compute approximate
similarities. This was done by exploiting the fact that the
Jaccard similarity can be computed approximately from
a smaller digest produced from the original sets [22, 23].
In particular, if h(·) is a hash function, LZJDh uses the k
smallest hash values as a proxy-set for the original ones, as
shown below
J(A,B) ≈ J
 k⋃
j=1
hjmin(A),
k⋃
j=1
hjmin(B)
 (3)
Where hnmin(A) indicates the n’th smallest hash value
from the setA. This approximation probabilistically bounds
the error at a rate of O(1/
√
k), and the LZJD paper uses
k = 1024 to get an error rate of ≈ 3%. For the purposes
of producing a similarity digest, we note that this hashing
scheme makes an excellent candidate for a similarity digest
that can be used in the same vein as ssdeep and sdhash.
The digest has the benefit of being a fixed maximum size,
regardless of the size of the input. We emphasize that the
error of this approximation is independent of the size of
the input set, and depends only on the size of the digest
itself. A direct result is that we can safely choose a fixed
digest size that reduces the error down to an acceptable
level, and use it for all files [22, 23]. We emphasize that
this bound allows us to be confident that the estimated
Jaccard similarity between two files of disparate size will
be close to the correct value. It does not guarantee that
LZJD will correctly match disparately sized files.
While the digest will be of a number of elements k,
the size of the digest on disk may be variable since each
item in the LZSet may be a variable number of bytes in
length. One might desire a constant digest storage size
to make storage planning simpler, and it can also aid in
efficient implementations by reducing degrees of freedom
(which will allow for more performance optimization). We
achieve this in this work with our design of a faster imple-
mentation of LZJD, which we will detail in section 3, and
show that we are able to obtain a digest with fixed storage
size and considerable performance improvements without
compromising on the accuracy of LZJD.
We argue that the grounding in Jaccard similarity ap-
proximations is also more interpretable than the scores
produced by ssdeep and sdhash. For a direct interpretation
of the math behind the LZJD score, consider two inputs
A and B. A score of 0.75 means that, for all sub-strings
shared between the LZSet(A) and LZSet(B), 75% of them
could be found in both files. This can be loosely interpreted
as saying that A and B share 75% of their byte strings.
This is not an exact measure of byte content similarity,
and will be impacted by two primary factors. First, that
the hashing of sub-strings does not attempt to maintain
information about string length. We expect this to be
approximate to the average string length over many hashes,
but this will introduce variability in the scores. Second,
that the LZ set creation can be impacted by the contents
of the binary, so it is possible to produce different sets for
similar inputs. We will see that this issue does impact the
score returned, but does not seem to reduce the matching
ability of LZJD. We also note that sdhash has a similar
issue where inputs can be modified by an adversary to re-
duce the matching score[24], but has found widespread use
regardless. So we do not believe this potential shortcoming
would be a hindrance in practice.
An approximate (empirically observed) bound can be
given to this interpretation by noting a unique property
of the FRASH framework. For each test, we can analyt-
ically determine what the Levenshtein distance [25], or
edit-distance, between files would have been in each test.
The edit-distance being the minimum number of opera-
tions needed to transform one string into another, where
an edit can either replace, remove, or add a byte to the
string. The edit distance between two binary files would
not normally be computationally feasible, as it is an O(n2)
cost to determine this value for two strings of length n.
Because the FRASH tests alter the binaries in a specific
way for each test, we know the edit-distance between the
original file and the modified versions created by FRASH.
With this insight, we find that LZJD tends to act as a
lower bound of (4)
J(LZSet(A),LZSet(B)) . edit-distance(A,B)
max (|A|, |B|) (4)
We use the approximately less-than symbol . because
this is not a proven bound, and does not hold for every
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experiment. Equation (4) is an empirical observation that
we discuss further in section 5. While it is satisfied by
the majority of tests in FRASH, it does not hold for all of
them. We argue that this interpretation may be useful for
practitioners.
Ultimately, the LZJDh similarity/distance performed
orders of magnitude faster than NCD, with equal or better
accuracy, on several malware datasets for both malware
detection (correctly labeling a binary as benign or mali-
cious) and malware family detection (finding the correct
malware family for a known malicious binary). This suc-
cess, combined with its use of a fixed-length digest for
faster distance computations, inspires our hypothesis that
it could be successfully used for the same kind of digital
forensic scenarios as ssdeep and sdhash. We evaluate this
feasibility in section 4. But first, we must further improve
the runtime efficiency of LZJD to make it practical for this
application.
3. A Faster LZJD Implementation
We now review the high level details of the original
LZJD implementation, and discuss our modifications that
result in a faster variant appropriate for the forensic use
case. This implementation is in Java, and we note that
both ssdeep and sdhash are written in C/C++. This may
mean that there is still room for improved performance
of our new LZJD implementation. We have made a Java
implementation 1 of this faster LZJD available to the public.
The program has the same command line arguments as
sdhash in order to facilitate integration with existing work
flows. We are also working on a C++ version 2 , though
performance optimization is not yet complete
The original version of LZJD was a rather naive Java
implementation. The set s in Algorithm 1 was a simple
HashSet of ByteBuffers. A ByteBuffer object represents a
byte string. This choice meant that equality comparisons
had to compare each byte in each buffer, which would
take time linear with respect to the current sub-string
under consideration. Furthermore, and to the detriment of
performance, these comparisons force the hash of the string
to be re-computed at every step, resulting in redundant
work.
Once the set of ByteBuffers was obtained, the MD5
hash of each member in the set was computed and the
lower 32 bits used for the min-hashing. This set of integers
was then sorted, and the minimum k integers created the
final set used for this faster variant of LZJD, which we will
denote as LZJDh. The MD5 function was chosen to ensure
even distribution of hash values, which are the result of its
original design as a cryptographic hash function.
We will present tests in subsection 3.1 that show these
modifications do not degrade the accuracy of LZJD but
1https://github.com/EdwardRaff/jLZJD
2https://github.com/EdwardRaff/LZJD
do significantly reduce the runtime cost. We do this by
performing hashing continuously as data is read in, and
representing every sub-string by the hashed integer coun-
terpart. By using a hash that we update with one byte
at a time, we no longer need to read the entire file into
memory for LZJDf to work. This may result in false col-
lisions during the LZ set construction as two hashes may
collide to the same integer, but we believe the cost of such
collisions to be minimal. The LZ algorithm will simply
continue processing the next byte, which is now a new
sub-string that is one byte longer. It is necessary that this
new sub-string does not currently exist in the set, because
the previous set did not contain the true prerequisite sub-
string either. For the new sub-string to also have a collision
becomes astronomically unlikely, assuming the hashes are
uniformly distributed. Even if several collisions occurred,
the impact on the output similarity should be minimal,
as the sub-strings of each sub-string are also in the sets
and included in the comparison. That is to say, if the
sub-string "abcdefg" is not included in the set due to a
hash collision, the contributions of "abcdef", "abcde", etc.,
are still present.
To make sure these hash values are of a high quality,
but avoiding the unnecessary quality of a hash function
like MD5, we use the MurmurHash33 function. This hash
function is designed to have an even distribution of hashes
and require minimal CPU time for computation. While not
originally designed for it, we re-implement this algorithm
so that the hash can be updated one byte at a time. This
requires keeping a four-byte memory that is updated and
used to compute the running hash output, in addition to
the internal state of the MurmurHash3 algorithm.
We also optimize the integer set object to take advan-
tage of the two unique artifacts of the situation. First,
it only needs to support the insertion of integers, so no
removals are needed. Second, since the integer values are
hashes, there is no need to apply any kind of hash function
to them, as they will already be evenly distributed (i.e.,
our hash set can use the identity function as its "hash"
function). We thus adapt an open addressing scheme with
double hashing [26, p. 528–529] that is normally used for
a hash table. We can reduce memory use by ignoring the
"value" part, and using a boolean array to indicate if an
entry is free or filled, and remove logic normally needed to
handle the removal of entries. The "key" alone will then
act as the set entry, with an implicit null "value". This
reduces memory use and execution time.
Once the entire file is processed, we will have a set of
integers, which we will then convert to a list of integers.
Rather than naively sorting the list, which is O(n log n),
we instead apply one of many algorithms that returns us
the k smallest items in O(n) time [27]. Beyond optimizing
how the set of k values is obtained, we can further improve
how they are stored and compared.
3https://github.com/aappleby/smhasher
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The original LZJD would store the set of k integers in
a set object, and to compute the size of the intersection of
two sets, would iterate over one set and query for its entries
in the other. This results in O∗(k) time complexity, but
is both memory inefficient and results in random memory
access that negatively impact cache and pre-fetching per-
formance. Instead we store the k items in a sorted array,
which is O(k log k), but k << n, so this sort is of minor
impact. The benefit is that we can compute the intersec-
tion by doing a merge-sort like comparison of the values in
each array, incrementally stepping forward in one list when
its value is less than another. This well-known approach
is given in Algorithm 2, and results in a non-amortized
O(k) runtime for digest comparisons. Further, the dense
arrays are more memory efficient, and the incremental walk
through the sorted arrays will work with the hardware
pre-fetching for improved performance.
Algorithm 2 Set Intersection Size via Sorted Lists
1: procedure Intersection(Integer arrays a and b)
2: posa ← 0,posb ← 0
3: size← 0
4: while posa < |a| and posb < |b| do
5: if a[posa] < b[posb] then
6: posa ← posa + 1
7: else if a[posa] > b[posb] then
8: posb ← posb + 1
9: else . Equal values, means item was in both
10: posb ← posb + 1
11: posa ← posa + 1
12: size← size+ 1
13: return size
3.1. LZJD Speedup Results
Having specified the modifications that produce the
faster LZJDf , it is important to validate that the hashing
approach does not meaningfully degrade accuracy com-
pared to the original LZJDh. To do so, we will repeat
the malware family classification experiments used in [13].
The malware classification problem has been previously
identified as an area whether similarity digests could be
useful[1], making this test of particular relevance in this
context of similarity digest comparisons. For this reason
we will also include ssdeep and sdhash in this comparison,
and see that LZJDf outperforms them both.
Malware family classification can be seen as a close
corollary to the digital forensics problem of finding a re-
lated file. For each malware sample, we wish to identify the
family it belongs to by comparing the sample to a database
of known malware. Each specimen in the same malware
family is intrinsically similar, and can be seen as one unit
of "sameness" for which the inter-family similarity should
be higher than the similarity to any other arbitrary sample.
This task is strongly correlated with matching a modified
file to its original file, but can be seen as a more challenging
scenario. This is because malware is often written by an
active adversary which attempts to avoid detection. Meta-
morphic malware, which changes itself upon propagation,
makes this a common and difficult scenario [28, 29].
The two malware datasets used each have two variants
of the experiment. The Microsoft malware comes from a
2015 Kaggle competition, and the data is provided and
labeled by Microsoft [30]. There are 9 malware families in
10,868 files. The first variant of this dataset uses only the
raw bytes of the original files, with the PE-header removed4.
The raw binaries take 50.8 GB of storage space, and we
will refer to this dataset as "Kaggle Bytes". The second
variant is the disassembly produced by IDA-Pro, which is
a more human-readable version of the files. This variant
takes up 147GB of space, and we will refer to this dataset
as "Kaggle ASM".
The second dataset is Android malware from the Drebin
corpus [31]. Following [13], we remove any malware family
that had less than 40 samples. This results in a dataset
with 20 malware families and 4664 samples. Android appli-
cations are normally distirbuted as APKs, which are simply
zip-files. Because the compression applied by zipping the
contents can impact the effectiveness of our hashes, we
evaluate the dataset in two ways. One using the raw APKs
("Drebin APK"), and the other using an uncompressed tar
of the APK contents ("Drebin TAR"). These variants take
6.4GB and 8.6GB respectively. Differences in performance
between these two datasets can be wholly attributed to
the impact of compression5, since it is the only source of
variation between the two sets.
We also note the importance of these tests in regards to
the performance of LZJD and other tools in high-entropy
situations. LZJD was analytically predicted to experience
sub-optimal behavior when encountering high entropy data,
yet empirically performed well when given such data [13].
The impact of high entropy is discussed further in the
FRASH test in subsubsection 4.2.1, which use random
bytes as part of the test to increase the matching challenge.
The Kaggle and Drebin datasets help to validate that LZJD
works even when high entropy is present, with the Android
APK corpus having a median byte entropy of 7.96. Thus
the performance of LZJD, ssdeep, and sdhash in this tast
can be seen as a test of all three approaches when dealing
with higher entropy content.
To evaluate all of our hashing options on this dataset,
we will use 10-fold cross validation. We will use the 1-
nearest neighbor algorithm to classify each sample against
the other folds. If the matching algorithm returns the
highest similarity score for a member of the same malware
family, then the algorithm correctly classified that point.
For each fold we will measure the balanced accuracy [32].
4The PE header info was removed by Microsoft to avoid accidental
infection, and cannot be reversed.
5We note that the amount of compression applied to the APKs is
generally light, as a trade-off is being made between storage size and
power consumption, both limited resources on mobile phones
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The balanced accuracy gives equal total weight to each
class. This is useful since the malware families are not
evenly distributed, and results would be skewed upward by
the most populous families. The accuracy for each method
on each dataset is presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Balanced accuracy results on each data and feature set.
Evaluated with 10-fold CV, standard deviation in parenthesis.
Dataset ssdeep (%) sdhash (%) LZJDf (%) LZJDh (%)
Kaggle Bytes 38.4 (1.4) 60.2 (2.3) 98.0 (1.2) 97.6 (1.5)
Kaggle ASM 26.6 (2.2) 28.8 (1.3) 96.7 (1.9) 97.1 (2.0)
Drebin APK 13.6 (1.6) 5.8 (0.5) 81.3 (4.6) 80.8 (2.6)
Drebin TAR 24.2 (2.9) 8.3 (1.2) 87.5 (2.0) 87.2 (2.8)
Here it is easy to see that our new LZJDf does not
meaningfully change the performance on these datasets
compared to the original LZJDh. The largest change is
an increase in standard deviation on the most difficult
dataset (Drebin APK). However LZJDf has slightly higher
mean accuracy and lower standard deviation on most of
the datasets. This closeness in results indicates the high
fidelity of our new approach, and that the simplifications
in LZSet implementation do not meaningfully impact the
quality of results. This gives us confidence that our changes
to LZJDf will generally perform well.
Comparing both LZJD implementations to ssdeep and
sdhash, we can see far superior classification accuracy. The
closest either ssdeep or sdhash come to matching LZJD’s
performance is on the Kaggle Bytes dataset, where sdhash
still trails by over 37 whole percentage points. We will
see this trend of LZJD having superior matching ability
repeated in section 4.
While sdhash performs better than ssdeep on the Kaggle
datasets, we also see sdhash produce degraded results on the
Drebin datasets. Its scores of 5.8% and 8.3% accuracy are
barely better than the 5% threshold for random guessing.
When inspecting these results manually, we discovered
that the root cause is related to the nature of sdhash’s
scoring algorithm. Sdhash ends up keying off features
generally common to all of the Android samples in our
corpus, producing average nearest neighbor scores of 99.7
and 99.9 for Drebin APK and Drebin TAR respectively.
This use case provides credence to the desire for a more
principled and interpretable score function.
Table 2. Statistics on the direct, absolute, and relative differ-
ences between LZJDh and LZJDf similarities for all pairwise
distances. Scores for the first four columns are out of a maxi-
mum score of 100 for the difference. The last two columns are
shown in percentage points.
Difference Absolute Difference Relative Difference
Dataset Avg. Stnd. Dev. Avg. Stnd. Dev. Avg. (%) Stnd. Dev. (%)
Kaggle Bytes 0.231 0.871 0.647 0.627 0.755 0.864
Kaggle ASM 0.010 0.793 0.531 0.588 0.601 0.783
Drebin APK 0.010 0.691 0.489 0.489 0.539 0.660
Drebin TAR -0.056 0.623 0.450 0.434 0.491 0.624
t5 0.112 0.505 0.332 0.397 0.351 0.445
To further confirm the high fidelity of LZJDf ’s approx-
imation of LZJDh, we also look at the statistics of all pair-
wise distance computations in each dataset, and include the
t5 corpus that will be further discussed and used in the next
section of this work. We will look at three sets of statistics,
where dh = LZJDh(A,B) and df = LZJDf (A,B). First
at the average difference, dh − df , which we want to see
centered around zero (indicating the approximation is unbi-
ased in practice). The average absolute difference, |dh−df |,
which we wish to see being as small as possible (indicat-
ing the approximation is accurate). Last, we will consider
the relative difference, |dh − df |/max (dh, df , 0.01), which
helps us further consider changes based on their relative
magnitudes. We add the 0.01 term to the relative differ-
ence computation to avoid division by zero, which occurred
when there was no error in the approximation of files with
no similarity.
The average and standard deviations for these three
statistics are presented in Table 2, where the maximum
possible difference would be 100. We can see that the
average relative difference is less than a percentage point,
with and at three standard deviations out is still less than
a 4% error. Similarly the worst average absolute difference
indicates that the majority of scores will differ by no more
than 4 points out of 100. We also see that the average
total difference is centered around zero. These results give
us clear validation that our LZJDf approximation is not
only faithful to the true nearest-neighbor ordering provided
by LZJDh, but also accurately reproduces the same score
values. That is to say, we have empirically observed that
|df − dh| < .
Table 3. Total evaluation time for each method in performing
10-fold CV. Time presented in seconds.
Dataset ssdeep sdhash LZJDf LZJDh
Kaggle Bytes 3.02× 103 8.64× 105 3.17× 103 1.73× 104
Kaggle ASM 3.25× 103 4.74× 106 1.44× 104 4.85× 104
Drebin APK 2.21× 102 1.30× 104 5.56× 102 7.17× 103
Drebin TAR 2.76× 102 2.04× 104 6.46× 102 7.65× 103
Table 4. Time spent hashing for each method in performing
10-fold CV. Time presented in seconds.
Dataset ssdeep sdhash LZJDf LZJDh
Kaggle Bytes 5.42× 102 1.72× 103 1.92× 103 1.22× 104
Kaggle ASM 2.26× 103 5.34× 103 7.44× 103 4.11× 104
Drebin APK 1.85× 101 2.35× 102 3.74× 102 4.99× 103
Drebin TAR 2.51× 101 3.52× 102 4.36× 102 5.47× 103
To evaluate the runtime of our new LZJDf , we can see
the total time taken for both hashing the files and perform-
ing the nearest neighbor searches in Table 3. As desired,
we can see that LZJDf is consistently faster than LZJDh,
by a factor of 3.4 to 12.9. We can further see that this
total evaluation time is comparable to ssdeep, and generally
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two orders of magnitude faster than sdhash. These large
speed advantages generally come from LZJDf being faster
to compare. These results support our claim that our new
LZJDf is fast enough to be a practical alternative to both
ssdeep and sdhash.
In Table 4, we show the time spent creating the digests
for this same task. This allows us to see that for ssdeep,
sdhash, and LZJDf , creating the digest itself is usually
small relatively to the amount of time spent. In these tests
data was read from hard disk, and we see that LZJDf takes
12% to 60% more time to create the digest compared to
sdhash. Given that the total time for LZJDf is orders of
magnitude faster than sdhash, this allows us to confirm that
the fast comparison time is the source of this dramatic speed
advantage. We will explore the performance differences
further in subsection 4.1.
Looking at the hash time also demonstrates the critical
importance of our optimization toward practical use. For
LZJDh, the hashing time is one to two orders of magnitude
greater than our improved LZJDf . LZJDh is the only
metric which spends the majority of time in producing the
digests itself for every dataset. These optimizations were
thus necessary to make the tool usable for practitioners,
with digest time comparable to sdhash while providing
faster digest comparison. For the remainder of the paper,
we will simply refer to LZJDf as LZJD for brevity.
4. Similarity Hash Comparisons using FRASH
The evaluation of similarity digests is not a trivial mat-
ter. It requires a diversity of file types (that should reflect
real world content) and some level of ground-truth about
which files are similar to others. Roussev [10] introduced
the t5 corpus for such evaluations6, and a manual evalu-
ation of sdhash was performed. The t5 corpus contains
a number of different file types, summarized in Table 5.
Roussev also proposed a number of challenges for which
one would want to use a similarity hash, which Breitinger
et al. drew from to create the automated FRASH test suite
[14]. FRASH is not exhaustive of all the ways in which one
may use a similarity digest, but it does provide a valuable
reference point across a spectrum of common use cases.
Similarly, the widely used t5 corpus is only a subset of
potential file types and data sizes that one may encounter.
Table 5. Contents of the t5 corpus. There are 4475 files in total,
totaling 1.9 GB in size.
html text pdf doc ppt xls jpg gif
Number of Files 1093 711 1073 533 368 250 362 67
Avg. File Size (KB) 66 345 590 433 1003 1164 156 218
In particular, the FRASH tests evaluate four desirable
qualities:
6available at http://roussev.net/t5/t5.html
1. Document similarity detection: where we wish to
determine which documents are intrinsically related,
such as multiple revisions of the same word document.
2. Embedded object detection: where the goal is to detect
that one object type (such as an image) has been
placed inside of another (such as a email document).
3. Fragment detection: where we are given a sub-string
of some larger file, and we wish to identify the source
of this sub-string.
4. Clustering files: where we wish to group similar files
together.
The FRASH suite is written in Ruby7, and allows for
easy integration of new similarity hashing schemes. The
tests are divided into two higher level sections. The first
section is Efficiency, which measures only runtime prop-
erties of the hash digest. This includes the digest time,
comparison time, and hash size relative to the input. Our
improvements to the LZJD algorithm tackle only these
quantities, which are critical when up to terabytes of data
may need triaging[33, 2].
The second, and more expansive, are the Sensitivity &
Robustness tests. These evaluate the ability of the hash
function to perform matching under various circumstances,
and the quality of the match score returned in each scenario.
These tests will show that LZJD possesses a superior ability
to correctly match a fragment to the correct source file,
even when presented with significant byte alterations or
comparatively small fragment sizes.
Below we will present and discuss the results from each
of the tests in the FRASH suite. For each result we will only
present a portion of the output for brevity and readability,
with the algorithm getting the most successful matches
shown in bold for each test. More complete results can be
found in Appendix A. All tests were run on a computer
running OSX version 10.10.5. With a 2.66 GHz Intel Core
i5 CPU and 16 GB of RAM. In initial testing, the FRASH
code was highly sensitive to random read/write time. Initial
runs on a standard HDD resulted in runtime that would
take days for as few as 20 files. For this reason, all code and
data used were stored in a RAM Disk. This is a method
by which a virtual disk is created on the system that acts
likes any other file system, but all stored files are kept only
in RAM. This avoided all issues with the random access
impact on test runtime.
4.1. Efficiency
In this section we are concerned with the computational
and storage efficiency of each hashing method. This is
measured by computing the hash digest for every file in the
t5 corpus, and creating a digest file containing every hash.
Once complete, all n2/2 pairwise distance computations
are done. This allows us to measure the runtime efficiency
7FRASH is available at http://www.fbreitinger.de/wp-content/
uploads/2017/04/FRASH_1.01.zip
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of the hashing process as well as the comparison of hashes,
and the storage efficiency of the hash size itself. For only
the efficiency tests, the SHA1 hash function is included
by the FRASH suite as a benchmark for both time and
space. The intuition for comparing with the SHA1 hash
is that it serves as a useful barometer for grounding the
compute efficiency of storage cost of these digests for those
less familiar with them.
Table 6. Runtime efficiency results. Time taken to compute
all hashes for each method, and the time needed to perform
all-pairs distance computations. All times measured in seconds
using only one CPU core. Best results shown in bold, and
second best in italics (ignoring SHA baseline).
Average Total All-pairs SHA1−1
sha1sum 0.01519 67.7 — 1.00
ssdeep 0.01223 54.5 32.1 0.81
sdhash 0.04241 189.0 496.5 2.79
LZJD 0.03159 140.8 8.2 2.08
The runtime results can be found in Table 6, where we
see the average and total time taken to hash the files of
the t5 corpus. The total hashing time (second column) is
measured using the Unix time command when giving the t5
corpus as the only input for each hashing implementation
. The rightmost column shows how many times longer
each method took to compute all hashes compared to the
SHA1 hash. Here we can see that sdhash is the slowest
hash function by a factor of 2.8, and that our Java LZJD
implementation is 34% faster than sdhash. Ssdeep is the
fastest at 23% faster than than the SHA1 algorithm, but
lacks in its ability to perform accurate matching once the
hashes are produced.
We note that while the FRASH test showed LZJD was
faster in hashing time compared to sdhash, our test sin
section subsection 3.1 showed it to be slower. The difference
between these tests is the use of the RAM disk for FRASH
to avoid prohibitive test times due to random accesses.
These results combined would indicate that sdhash and
LZJD are roughly comparable in hashing time, and we
may expect to see variation in which one is faster based on
unique hardware combinations and situations.
LZJD’s runtime performance is better still when we look
at the time needed for comparing the hash outputs, and is
over 60 times faster than sdhash in this respect, and still 3.9
times faster than ssdeep. This would indicate that LZJD
would be preferable in a situation where we have many
known objects of interest in a database, and need to process
the contents of a new device against the known database.
One might argue that having a faster digest comparison is
more important than a faster digest calculation. Indeed,
others have worked on building special indexes specifically
to accelerate the bottleneck of comparing many digests[8].
The time needed to hash n files is naturally an O(n)
task, but comparing the n derived hashes to an existing
database of m hashes is O(nm) in complexity. The latter
will clearly become the dominant cost as the number of
objects under consideration increases, and so we would
want to minimize its base time requirements as much as
possible. An example of this can be found in [3], where
sdhash and ssdeep were used on 1.2 million files extracted
from firmware images. Due to the computational burden at
comparison time, these hashes couldn’t be applied to the
entire corpus. Our results in subsection 3.1 corroborate this
high comparison time cost, where we see LZJD compare
favorably to both ssdeep and sdhash. LZJD’s efficient
digest comparison pushes back this limitation.
We observe that this issue of runtime efficiency has
been noted before, and others have attempted to build
more efficient indices for specific use cases. Winter et al.
[34] built an indexing scheme for the ssdeep algorithm, but
ssdeep’s low precision and recall limit the utility of such
a tool. Breitinger et al. [35] build a more general purpose
index that is compatible with sdhash, but cannot return or
filter based on similarity scores or indicate which specific
file as a match. This work was later extended to resolve
these issues, allowing it to return exact file matches [36, 37].
While able to obtain speedups of up to a factor of 2.6, it
does not guarantee all matches will be found.
LZJD provides a sound method of circumventing these
issues that may be explored in future work. Since LZJD is a
valid distance metric, it avails itself to more principled and
existing indexing strategies that are designed for metric
spaces. These indices support O(log n) query time[38, 39,
40, 41] and guarantee that all neighbors will be found.
Parallel Computation
All of the runtime performance numbers addressed so
far, and that we will discuss for the remainder of this
work, are with respect to single-core execution. We take a
brief moment to mention that both sdhash and our LZJD
implementation support parallel computation. Effective
speedup will be a factor of the number of cores available,
as well as the amount of data being processed. The more
data being computed on, the easier it is to effectively use
more cores.
Some parallel performance tests were run on a large
multi-core server to test both sdhash and LZJD’s scalability.
This server has four Intel Xeons with 20 cores each, for
a total of 80 CPU cores, 2 TB of RAM, and 40 TB of
SSD storage. Single threaded on this machine, sdhash took
77 seconds to create a digest of the t5 corpus, and 262
seconds to perform the all-pairs comparison. LZJD took 79
seconds for the digest, and and 6.7 seconds for the all-pairs
comparison.
Overall, testing on this machine indicates that sdhash
and LZJD have approximately the same scaling as more
cores are used. Using all 80 cores, sdhash had a digest
speedup of 13.0x and LZJD 13.6x. While the digest prob-
lem is trivially parallelizable, reading the data from disk
becomes the bottle neck and limits scalability. For the
digest all-pairs comparison, sdhash received a speedup of
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6.5x and LZJD of 5.1x. In this case scalability is likely
limited by memory bottlenecks, as it is difficult to keep
80 cores adequately primed with a relatively small amount
of data. In the case of LZJD, at 5.1x speedup the time
for LZJD all-pairs is just 1.3 seconds, most of which is
spent reading in the digest file from disk. We also note
that LZJD’s single threaded time of 6.7 seconds is already
faster than the 40.2 seconds sdhash takes when using all
80 cores.
4.1.1. Compression
The efficiency test in FRASH also produces a set of
compression results. These results are concerned with the
size of the hash digest with respect to the original file sizes.
All things being equal, it is preferable to have a digest
that is smaller rather than larger. A smaller digest size
allows for the storage and transport of larger databases,
and gives some indication about the information efficiency
of the digest itself.
Table 7. Compression test results. First column shows the
average length of the digest, followed by the average ratio
between digest length and original file length. The last two
columns show the maximum ratio encountered and the size of
the entire digest for all files.
Avg. Length Avg. Ratio (%) Max Length (ratio) Digest Size
sha1sum 20 B 0.0047 — 420 KB
ssdeep 57 B 0.0133 78 B (≤0.01%) 592 KB
sdhash 10.6 KB 2.5203 409 KB (2.93%) 61.3 MB
LZJD 4.01 KB 0.9566 4.01 KB (10.1%) 23.5 MB
The compression results are shown in Table 7, where
the first two columns present the average length of the
digest, and the average percentage of the digest size with
respect to the original file. Here we can see that SHA1 and
ssdeep both produce very small digests. Sdhash produces
the largest digests, with an average of 10.6 KB that is
usually 2.5% of the original file size. LZJD falls in a middle
ground, with an average digest of 4 KB, 2.65 times smaller
than sdhash. By the nature of our LZJD hash, the digest
size will never be more than 4 KB8. Smaller digests may
occur for small files which can be represented with less
than 1000 dictionary entries for the Lempel-Ziv process.
This makes LZJD especially effective for large files, with
theoretical support for its method of production. However,
LZJD’s fixed size can also result in an overly large digest
for small files, as can be seen by the maximum digest-size
to original-size ratio of 10%.
4.2. Sensitivity & Robustness
We will now review the Sensitivity & Robustness tests
that are a part of the FRASH framework. Tests sub-
subsection 4.2.1 and subsubsection 4.2.2 will run a digest
8With minor overhead for the header matching sdhash’s output
style.
comparison on only two files at a time, namely a source
file and a target file. The source file will be an unaltered
file from the t5 corpus. The target file will be a modified
version of the source file. These tests will be measuring
behavior of the scoring methods used and how they change
with changes to a single file. The implicit assumption of
the FRASH framework is that a higher score between two
matching files is always better, all other things being equal.
As we discussed in section 2, the LZJD score will be based
on the amount of byte similarity – and will not attempt to
reflect "match or no match" as ssdeep and sdhash do. This
makes comparing the results in these tests more challeng-
ing, and we will discuss the issue of score function behavior
further in section 5.
Tests subsubsection 4.2.3 and subsubsection 4.2.4 will
generate a digest database from the whole t5 corpus, and
then see if a target file (still a modified version of one of
the t5 source files) can be correctly matched to its source.
In these tests the goal is for us to correctly match a file to
its source, and can be viewed as equivalent to the nearest
neighbor problem we visited in section 3. These tests can
be thought of as a harder variant of the task from a machine
learning sense, as there is only one correct neighbor for
each test point (which would be the source point), where
any file from the same class would be considered correct for
the tests done in section 3. We will see that LZJD presents
a new state-of-the-art in matching ability, far exceeding
both ssdeep and sdhash in its matching ability.
4.2.1. Single Common Block correlation
The Single Common Block (SCB) test is designed to
determine how small a "common block" of identical content
can be before a digest algorithm produces a score of zero
(i.e., no commonality). This test compares only two files at
a time, where each file has random byte contents. A portion
of each file will be set to the same common content, and this
common block will be iteratively decreased in size. This
test was run 50 times with 50 different source files to extract
common blocks from. In the original FRASH testing, it
was found that sdhash was able to produce matches for
smaller common blocks then ssdeep, but ssdeep was able
to produce higher matching scores.
For the tables in this section, the Average Block size
(KB) indicates how small the common object’s size was to
reach a score greater than or equal to a minimum score
threshold. Similarly, Average Block size (%) is how small
this single common object was as a percentage of the block
size. The Matches line in each table is the number of
files (out of the 50 selected) that were able to be matched
and achieve a score at or above the given score. The
two aforementioned averages are with respect to the files
matched at that level.
This particular test puts LZJD at a disadvantage, be-
cause its score does not have the same meaning as sd-
hash and ssdeep, and because the files are produced with
completely random byte sequences. Random bytes are a
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weakness of LZJD in the case of matching similarity, be-
cause the LZ algorithm will begin collecting all smallest
sub-strings, which will cause a non-zero match to occur.
This makes it impossible to reach the original termination
case of FRASH, and we we terminate LZJD in this test
after a SCB size of 16KB. Thus, when interpreting Table 8
and Table 9, the score that has an average block size of
16 KB should be treated as the same as the zero score for
sdhash and ssdeep.
Table 8. Single Common Block results for a 2MB file. Columns
show the scores achieved, and rows the size of the common block
of content, and the number of successful matches (max of 50).
Score ≥25 ≥15 ≥10 ≥5 0
ss
de
ep
Avg. block size (KB) 386 — — — 393
Avg. block size (%) 18.9 — — — 19.2
Matches 23 — — — 50
sd
ha
sh
Avg. block size (KB) 730 501 383 188 17.9
Avg. block size (%) 35.7 24.5 18.7 9.17 0.88
Matches 34 44 50 50 50
L
Z
JD
Avg. block size (KB) — 868 376 16 —
Avg. block size (%) — 42.4 18.4 0.78 —
Matches — 46 50 50 —
Inspecting the results for a 2MB total block size in
Table 8, LZJD does not do well in this particular test.
LZJD is unable to produce scores in the same large ranges
as sdhash and ssdeep, but LZJD is also not designed to
produce such scores. The use of completely random byte
strings as the filler content of the SCB test also deflates
the score LZJD gives, due to the increased number of sub-
strings the Lempel-Ziv algorithm will find within these high
entropy regions. This is a worst-case scenario for LZJD, as
was theoretically analyzed in [13].
Table 9. Single Common Block results for a 512 KB file.
Columns show the scores achieved, and rows the size of the
common block of content, and the number of successful matches
(max of 50).
Score ≥25 ≥20 ≥15 ≥10 0
ss
de
ep
Avg. block size (KB) 94.3 106 — — 393
Avg. block size (%) 18.4 20.6 — — 19.2
Matches 28 5 — — 50
sd
ha
sh
Avg. block size (KB) 185 160 140 107 16
Avg. block size (%) 36.1 31.3 27.3 20.9 3.12
Matches 32 37 44 50 50
L
Z
JD
Avg. block size (KB) 226 80.6 16.6 — —
Avg. block size (%) 44.2 15.8 3.25 — —
Matches 39 50 50 — —
The particular performance of LZJD at the lowest end
of the score range is comparable to or better than sdhash,
depending on which results are inspected. This can be
better seen for a 512KB total block size, as shown in
Table 9. Here we can see for a score of ≥20, sdhash requires
a common block that is 31% of the total block size, where
LZJD requires a common block size of only 16%. The
results for the 8 MB total block size follow this pattern,
and can be found in Appendix A.
We again note that this test is comparing the score of
only two files at a time, and is not as relevant for LZJD since
it does not try to produce the same types of score values
as sdhash and ssdeep. LZJD’s score is best interpreted
as an approximate measure of the byte similarity of two
files, and in practice, we will see that it is best viewed as
an approximate lower bound on the percentage of similar
bytes.
Despite the SCB tests being a weak area for LZJD, the
use of random bytes in the test construction also make this
a worst-case scenario for LZJD. In practice, few files will
make use of purely random byte sequences (which would
have a byte entropy near 8). One of the only scenarios where
we would expect the find such high-entropy sub-strings in a
file is when dealing with malware and packed or compressed
binaries, which corresponds to the scenario where LZJD
was originally demonstrated to perform well [13], where
it was tested with Windows malware and Android APKs
(which are compressed zip files). Still, removing the impact
of completely random sub-strings on LZJD is an area for
future research and improvement.
4.2.2. Random-noise-resistance
The random noise test attempts to produce false neg-
atives by randomly altering the file one byte at a time.
After modification, the test records how many matches are
achieved at each score and how many edits where required
to reduce the score to that level. Bytes are altered via ran-
dom insertions, deletions, and substitutions, and location
is selected randomly.
As noted in the original FRASH paper [14], the random
noise resistance test is computationally demanding, and
so we use only a random sample of 100 files from the t5
corpus. Our results find that LZJD is significantly more
resistant to such alterations than either ssdeep or sdhash,
which further increases the time it takes the tests to run.
To reduce test runtime, after 200 edits, we begin altering
the files by 10 bytes at a time. Once we reach 2000 edits,
we increase to 100 edits at a time, and so on. We also add
an early termination after 80% of the file is altered, due to
the extreme ranges that LZJD achieves in matching.
The results of running the random noise test are shown
in Table 10, where Matches indicates how many files
achieved a given match score, and Avg. changes is the
average amount of bytes that needed to be altered for this
score to appear, as a percentage of that file’s size. For
example, ssdeep was able to get a score equal to or higher
than 70 for only 88 of the 100 files tested. It only took
changing 0.005% of the byte contents of a file to lower the
score of ssdeep to this level. The better an algorithm’s
resistance to noise, the more we should be able to alter a file
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and still obtain a relatively high score. Because ssdeep and
sdhash desire to produce a maximal score for any match,
we would want to see a maximally high matching score for
any percentage of edits. Under the LZJD interpretation
of content similarity, we want the matching score to be
similar to the percent of byte alterations performed. That
is to say, if 25% of the bytes were altered in the target file,
we want to see LZJD return a score of 75 (i.e., 100-25% =
75).
Table 10. Random Noise tests. Best average number of changes
needed to reduce the matching score to a specific level is shown
in bold.
Score ≥70 ≥50 ≥40 ≥25 ≥10
ss
de
ep Avg. changes (%) 0.0052 0.0206 0.0615 — —
Matches 88 18 7 — —
sd
ha
sh Avg. changes (%) 0.1068 0.2775 0.3940 0.5492 0.9739
Matches 96 99 100 100 99
L
Z
JD Avg. changes (%) 0.0238 0.6061 1.967 10.99 48.63
Matches 75 96 99 100 77
In examining the full results (see Appendix A), it is
clear that sdhash performs best when we consider only
the higher scores (≥ 55). It routinely obtains the lowest
percentage of average changes, followed by LZJD, and then
ssdeep. While ssdeep is the only method to obtain the
most high scores (≥ 80), this is of little utility due to the
small number of changes needed to reduce such scores.
The robustness of LZJD becomes more apparent when
we consider a score of ≥ 50, at which point LZJD requires
twice as many byte edits to produce such a score compared
to sdhash. Reducing LZJD to a score of ≥ 40 required
altering 1.97% of the file, where sdhash produces a score of
zero (no match) after an average of only 1.56% of the file is
edited. The rate at which LZJD’s score is lowered decreases
with each byte edit, and so its performance advantage
improves dramatically relative to sdhash and ssdeep as
we move down in matching score. Reducing LZJD to a
score of 25 required 11.0% of the bytes to be altered, which
is 20 times greater than for sdhash. At the extreme end,
reducing LZJD to a score of ≥ 10 requires editing almost
half the file. The 77 matches at this level is lower than
100 because the random noise test couldn’t get LZJD to
produce a score that low for many files, and the FRASH
test framework didn’t anticipate a scenario where a score of
0 could not be obtained. This indicates a strong matching
ability beyond the expectations of the FRASH designers.
The FRASH code failed to count the files which obtained
a score in the (25, 10) range, and could not be reduced to
the [10, 0) before the test was forced to finish running by
our modifications.
4.2.3. Fragment Test
In the fragment tests of FRASH, a portion of the each
file is removed, and then the remaining fragment is searched
for against the database of all complete file hashes. The
size of the fragment starts at 95%, nearly the whole file,
and decreases down to only a 1% portion of the original file.
The motivation of these tests are to determine how small a
fragment can be while still being matched with the source
file. This scenario may occur with any storage or transport
format where a file may be broken up into chunks, such as
the fragment storage in a file system or individual packets
in network traffic.
FRASH runs these fragmentation tests in two modes,
one where the file has data removed from the end only (end
cut), and one where a random portion of the file is removed
from both the beginning and end of the file (random cut).
In the former case, the fragment always starts as the same
string of bytes but ends prematurely. In the latter case, the
fragment is essentially a random portion of the file (and
most likely from near the middle of the original file). The
results of the fragment tests are presented in the next two
tables. In each table, the File Size (%) is the size of the file
fragment as a percentage of the original file it came from.
Table 11. Fragment detection test result, random cut. Column
indicates size of the fragment with respect to the source file.
Rows show percent of correctly matched files and average score
for correctly matched files.
File Size (%) 95 50 10 5 3 1
ss
de
ep Matches (%) 99.9 91.3 0.65 <0.01 0 0
Avg. Score 96.7 65.9 46.2 61.0 — —
sd
ha
sh Matches (%) 100 100 98.1 90.6 81.1 57.9
Avg. Score 83.4 68.5 75.7 73.4 76.7 81.0
L
Z
JD Matches (%) 100 100 >99.9 99.9 99.4 98.5
Avg. Score 72.4 24.9 6.43 3.88 2.73 1.31
Table 12. Fragment detection test result, end cut. Column
indicates size of the fragment with respect to the source file.
Rows show percent of correctly matched files and average score
for correctly matched files.
File Size (%) 95 50 10 5 3 1
ss
de
ep Matches (%) 100 93.1 1.73 0.49 0.20 0
Avg. Score 97.7 71.7 56.9 55.7 47.9 —
sd
ha
sh Matches (%) 100 100 98.3 91.1 82.5 58.7
Avg. Score 97.3 99.5 97.9 96.9 95.04 90.5
L
Z
JD Matches (%) 100 100 100 100 100 99.7
Avg. Score 92.8 40.1 8.33 4.63 3.09 1.36
The ssdeep algorithm is particularly vulnerable to this
approach, and is significantly degraded in its ability to
correctly match files by a fragment being just 50% of the
original file size. Sdhash is more robust, and is not mean-
ingfully impacted in matching ability until fragments are
5% of the original file size or less, where it starts to quickly
degrade in accuracy. We also notice a confusing behavior
in the average matched score produced by sdhash. In Ta-
ble 12, the sdhash score slowly decreases from high 90s to
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Figure 1. Fragment detection random-cut results, x-axis shows
the fragment size as a precentage of the original file, and y-axis
shows the number of files correctly matched.
low 90s, which is a reasonable behavior to expect as the
fragment size decreases. However, in Table 11, the sdhash
score first decreases from the low 80s to the low 70s, and
then begins increasing against back into the low 80s.
Compared to sdhash, LZJD obtains lower average match-
ing scores. In Table 12, these scores are nearly perfectly
aligned with the interpretation of a similarity of X% in-
dicating that the X% of the contents are the same. The
scores returned for LZJD are a bit below this expectation
in Table 11, but still match the general trend. This can be
explained by the LZSet construction process being sensitive
to changes in the byte string, causing changes in the set. In
the case of Table 12, corresponding to the end cut version
of the fragment test, the start of the byte string will remain
unchanged. This means the LZ set generated will also be
generated in the same order, and will simply stop early once
the fragment comes to a premature end. This results in a
high quality match of LZ set contents when computing the
Jaccard similarity. In the random cut case of Table 11, the
beginning of the file has been removed. This changes the
set of sub-strings computed by the LZ approach, resulting
in a lowered match. However the match is still robust, as
evident by the high number of matches LZJD obtained.
This robustness in matching ability is emphasized in
Figure 1, where we plot the number of correct matches in
the random-cut test against the size of the fragment as a
percentage of the original file. We can clearly see ssdeep
requires fragments to be 60% of the original file or larger
to get reliable matches. Sdhash holds for a larger range,
but begins dropping once the fragments are 10% of the
original file or less. LZJD performs well across all sizes,
still obtaining the majority of matches even at 1% size.
The end-cut version of the fragmentation tests are similar,
and can be numerically compared in the Appendix.
We claim that this robustness is the more important
property. The fragment results support the conclusion that
LZJD is more robust in its ability to match small fragments
to their source files compared to ssdeep and sdhash. In all
cases, LZJD is either tied with or better than sdhash at
this task. Even down to 1% fragment sizes, LZJD is able to
match 99% of fragments to their source file. In comparison,
sdhash is only able to match just under 60% of fragments.
4.2.4. Alignment Test
One area of weakness for many similarity hash functions
is padding inserted at the beginning of a file. Ssdeep in
particular is weak in this scenario [42]. The alignment test
in FRASH is designed for this scenario, and inserts random
bytes into the beginning of a file, and then attempts to
match it back against the full database. An analysis of the
LZSet algorithm used by LZJD may also lead one to assume
that LZJD is susceptible to this same problem. Because
the LZSet is built incrementally, strings seen earlier can
impact the LZSet, changing what is captured in the later
sections of the byte string. The results of this section will
show that while this could be a problem for LZJD in the
limit, the performance on the FRASH tests indicate that
its matching ability is not hampered by this scenario.
The FRASH tests for matching in-spite of excess padding
is run in two modes. One where a fixed number of bytes are
added to the file, and the other where a fixed percentage of
the original file size is added to the front. The results for
the latter scenario are presented in Table 13. We present
only the percentage results as they are the most aggressive
and challenging version of the test.
Table 13. Alignment test result. Column shows the size of the
added bytes, as a percentage of original file size. Rows show
percent of correctly matched files and average score for correctly
matched files.
Added (%) 10 50 100 300 500
ss
de
ep Matches (%) 99.6 92.8 72.4 3.03 0
Avg. Score 91.1 71.7 60.1 35.3 —
sd
ha
sh Matches (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Avg. Score 67.6 69.2 68.6 68.8 68.2
L
Z
JD Matches (%) 100 100 100 100 100
Avg. Score 40.9 22.1 14.8 6.79 4.53
As expected, we can see that ssdeep is significantly
impacted by the front-padding of the binary, and can only
match 3% of files when 300% of the file size is padded to
the front. Both sdhash and LZJD are able to match 100%
of files in the tested range. We also see that the scores
for both are negatively impacted by the addition of the
bytes to the front of the file. For sdhash, the scores are in
the high 60s instead of the normal 80s-90s that it is able
to achieve in the other benchmarks. Because there is no
particular interpretation that applies to the sdhash score,
we can not offer any analysis as to cause or reason.
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For LZJD, we would expect a score in the range of
1/(1 + x/100), where x is the percent of the file size added
as padding. In each case, the LZJD score is one third to
one half of this expected value. This can be explained by
the Lempel-Ziv encoding scheme, which creates a maximal
number of entries in the set when presented with high
entropy (i.e., random looking) data. Because the x% of
bytes added by FRASH are random, this will create dispro-
portionately more entries in the LZ set, and thus become
a larger portion of the hash digest. The effect is that there
will be considerably more than x% new hashes added to
the set, with the amount more being dependent upon the
normal entropy of the file under consideration. Because
these entries in the hash are from random sub-strings, they
are unlikely to appear in another file, and so they are not
matched and the score is reduced.
5. Discussion
At this point we have performed extensive testing of
LZJD compared to ssdeep and sdhash. It is faster to hash,
faster at hash comparisons, produces more compact hashes,
and provides higher matching accuracy for smaller files,
compared to these previous tools. Only ssdeep is faster at
hashing and has smaller digests, but its matching ability is
not sufficient for the multitude of file types in the t5 corpus.
This coalesces to a strong argument for the use of LZJD
as an alternative to ssdeep and sdhash for digital forensic
applications. The faster comparison time and accuracy
combined will allow LZJD to be used in real deployments
with databases larger than what either ssdeep or sdhash can
handle, while stemming a natural increase in false positives
due to the use of larger datasets. This runtime advantage is
critical for tool adoption, as practitioners would be unlikely
to make use of a tool that did not produce timely results.
5.1. LZJD use Compared to Ssdeep and Sdhash
The most significant difference between LZJD and prior
similarity digests is the nature of the score value produced.
LZJD, like ssdeep and sdhash, will need a "significance"
threshold to be determined which may change for different
file types and scenarios. The difference comes in the nature
of the score’s value itself. For ssdeep and sdhash, the
exact score x has no particular meaning, and instead a
single meaning is often prescribed to only a few ranges of
values. For example, the [21− 100], [11− 20], and [1− 10]
recommended for sdhash divide up the entire positive range
of values into classifications of "Strong", "Marginal", and
"Weak" correlation [2]. This can be uninformative when
multiple files produce high scores — an issue that occurred
in our malware experiments in subsection 3.1.
For LZJD, we can interpret the score as a rough mea-
sure of byte similarity, or more precisely, as an approximate
lower bound on a normalized edit-distance between the files.
Not only does this give us an interpretation of the score
returned by LZJD, but we can use it to infer what a reason-
able threshold might be for many file types and scenarios.
This may require more thought on the practitioner’s part,
that is to make an estimate of what the expected overlap
between files might be, or what the maximum score one
might expect. Though this requires more mental effort, it is
not a requirement — and users could choose to empirically
determine their desired scores just as they have done with
ssdeep and sdhash. We believe that this interpretation
though will ultimately aid its use not just by giving it
meaning, but avoiding failure-cases that can occur without
such a background (as exemplified by sdhash’s failure in
subsection 3.1).
To give concrete examples of what we mean, consider
that file types such as PDFs and EXEs have some amount
of boiler-plate mandated by the file format’s specification,
or may simply be common to most files of that type. In
this scenario, one would expect LZJD to produce a minimal
score dependent on how much of the boilerplate or common
content is shared across files. If the practitioner knows
what this level of boilerplate is, they can use that as a
minimum-threshold for potential matches.
As another example, consider the results of the fragment
tests in subsubsection 4.2.3. If an analyst were to use
LZJD in this fragment scenario, where it is known that we
have a α byte long file fragment that we want to compare
against a known (larger) file of length β, it may then be
reasonable to use an adjusted scoring of sim(α, β) · β/α to
adjust for the fact that our expected similarity should not
generally exceed the ratio of the differences in file length
(i.e., α/β). This requires thought on the analyst’s part to
realize that smaller scores should be expected, but accurate
matching is still possible — and thus might want to alter
their interpretation of the score’s significance.
5.2. LZJD Score Interpretation
As we have discussed throughout this work, LZJD’s
score is more interpretable than the ones returned by ssdeep
and sdhash. We noted in section 2 that LZJD’s score can
be loosely interpreted as the percentage of shared byte
contents between files, and empirically tends to act as a
lower bound on a normalized edit distance (as specified
in equation (4)). The extensive experiments provided by
FRASH in section 4 support this conclusion. To condense
these results, we plot in Figure 2 the relationship between
LZJD’s score and actual percentage of shared bytes. This
percentage can be determined for all of the FRASH tests,
though would not be known a priori in practice. These
results show LZJD almost uniformly under-estimating the
percentage of bytes altered. The only exception being the
five points from the Single Common Block tests, three of
which are from the most-extreme terminating state. This
overall result leads us to recommend treating LZJD’s score
as a lower bound on the percentage of bytes altered. That
is to say, if LZJD returns a score of 23, then it is relatively
safe to assume that the two files share at least 23% of
their byte contents with each other. While this is not a
guarantee, it is empirically supported by a considerable
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Figure 2. Comparing the LZJD similarity score (x-axis) with
the actual percentage of altered or added bytes (y-axis) for all
tests run by the FRASH suite. The ideal 1-to-1 correspondence
(4) is shown as a dashed line. Values above this line indicate
LZJD under-estimating the change in bytes.
majority of test cases (84 out of 89 data points) and we
believe will be useful to the practitioner.
The immediate question would be why does LZJD tend
to produce a lower bound estimate? The LZSet method
that produces the initial set of sub-strings is sensitive to
single byte alterations. Because the set is constructed in
a sequential manner, once one byte is altered, it has the
potential to propagate forward and alter the rest of the set.
This byte sensitivity is what causes LZJD to act as a lower
bound, and is the reason why it is often difficult for LZJD to
obtain high match scores above 50%. Despite this weakness
LZJD operates effectively, and the few cases where LZJD
over-estimated the percentage of bytes changed are cases
where LZJD successfully matched 100% of the altered files
to their original sources.
This is also connected with the effect of random byte
sequences on LZJD’s similarity score, as random bytes will
cause the same impact on the LZSet. The impact of random
bytes is tested by the SCB, Alignment, and Random Noise
tests in FRASH. All three of theses tests make use of
random bytes to create the test case files. These tests
show that LZJD can perform well even if random bytes
are present, but does tend to impact the similarity score
LZJD returns. The Malware tests in subsection 3.1 also
test a higher average entropy file than the t5 corpus, which
has become the standard benchmark corpus for similarity
digests. The exact entropy statistics are shown in Table 14.
The performance of LZJD in accurately matching nearest
neighbors when the average and median file entropy is as
high as 7.96 shows that this weakness does not halt LZJD’s
matching ability.
Table 14. Statistics on file entropy broken down by each corpus
used in this work.
Kaggle Android
Entropy Bytes ASM APK TAR t5
Average 6.73 4.48 7.96 6.68 5.88
Median 6.83 4.51 7.96 6.77 5.32
Min 1.64 3.83 4.10 2.61 0.21
Max 7.85 5.35 8.00 8.00 8.00
Since current methods used for digest similarity do not
return interpretable similarity scores, there are no current
use-cases to compare LZJD against. As analysts begin
to use LZJD, we believe the interpretability will become
useful to practitioners. Investigating the reality of these
hypotheses is beyond the scope of this work. In particular,
this new ability may have an impact on:
1. New user training. Being able to explain the results
that a method produces is a natural way to help new
users learn and understand their tools, and the LZJD
algorithm itself can be specified with only a few lines
of code. This may aid in helping and enabling tool
adoption to a wider breadth of professionals and skill
sets.
2. Evidence and testimony. In legal proceedings there
is often a need to present evidence to support a
case, either in court or in the pursuit of an arrest
warrant, for example. That LZJD can be described
in a less technical manner as a "conservative estimate
of shared content" between two files could be useful
in this regard, and is empirically supported. The
exact interpretation as the intersection of compression
dictionaries is available as well for more technical
needs.
3. Machine Learning applications. While ssdeep and
sdhash have been used with other machine learning
methods before, they both lack the nice metric space
and kernel properties of the Jaccard distance that
LZJD inherits. We suspect LZJD will thus find wider
user with machine learning methods, and its inter-
pretable descriptions will aid in being able to explain
and interpret larger models built using LZJD as a
component.
To our knowledge, there has yet to be any discussion
on what the ideal scoring approach would be for a simi-
larity digest. Our results open an opportunity to discuss
such potential design choices. In particular, should scores
indicate a level of similarity (resemblance), or a level of
commonality (containment)? By this we mean, should
scores be interpretable as a measure of how much content
of two files are shared in aggregate (as LZJD currently
does)? Or should scores reflect that two byte strings share
some commonality, such as being from the same file, or how
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much one file could be subsumed by another (as sdhash
does)? For LZJD, we have already given one instance in
which its design could be modified to reflect a preference
for commonality when searching for the source of a file frag-
ment (see the discussion near the end of subsection 5.1).
There may also be other goals toward which one could
design a similarity digest, but leave further discussion of
this question for future work.
5.2.1. On Resemblance and Containment
We take a moment to further discuss the resemblance
vs containment question with respect to the results we saw
with LZJD. As mentioned in section 2, LZJD measures
the resemblance between LZ sets A and B. That we use
the Jaccard similarity, for the purpose of computing re-
semblance, is what allows us to develop a digest of fixed
size. Another potential measure of interest is containment,
which can be expressed as (5).
c(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A| (5)
Containment asks how much of set A is contained within
set B. Sdhash’s variable length digest sizes allow it to
answer queries regarding either containment or resemblance
fashion [2]. Answering containment queries in an unbiased
manner requires such variable-length digests [22].
The FRASH Fragmentation, Alignment, and Single
Common Block (SCB) tests (subsubsection 4.2.3, subsub-
section 4.2.4 and subsubsection 4.2.1 respectively) are tests
of containment. LZJD out-performs both ssdeep and sd-
hash in the fragmentation tests, especially for extreme
cases. LZJD ties with sdhash in obtaining all matches for
Alignment, and LZJD has only comparable performance to
sdhash in the SCB tests. One may then wonder, if LZJD
is answering resemblance, how is it able to do well at these
containment tasks, and even outperform approaches that
should have an advantage?
We believe the insight into understanding this approach
is to recognize that c(A,B) ≥ J(A,B) ≥ 0. That is to
say, the resemblance query is necessarily a lower bound on
containment. If the correct containment score is zero, the
resemblance score must necessarily also be zero. Thus LZJD
will never over-estimate the containment case. Obtaining
the same matching scores then relies on obtaining the
same rank ordering between resemblance and containment.
Our results with the FRASH tests would indicate that
LZJD does well in this regard, as it achieves matching
performance comparable to or better than sdhash in all
tests.
5.3. Future Work
Another advantage of the LZJD approach, which we
have not tested in this work, is further scaling abilities
of the digest hash. Because the LZJD hash produces a
valid distance metric, it is possible to use metric indexes to
prune distance computations from a search[40, 38]. Further
speedups can be obtained by performing partial digest com-
parisons. Because the LZJD hash is obtained by selecting
the k smallest hash values, every LZJD digest of length k
contains the k′ digest ∀k′ < k. This gives a natural way to
balance between speed and accuracy. We leave exploring
these options to future work.
File size is also an important consideration in digest
construction and application. This has been tested to some
degree by the FRASH suite and our Malware classification
tests. The fragment tests in section subsubsection 4.2.3
are explicitly testing matching performance when file sizes
differ by up to two orders of magnitude (the original file
compared to a 1% fragment). The Kaggle ASM corpus has
an average file size of 13.5 MB, compared to only 425 KB
for the t5 corpus normally used. In both of these cases,
LZJD outperforms ssdeep and sdhash by wide margins.
Further exploring the impact of large file size comparisons
(GB vs GB) and disparate size comparisons (GB vs KB)
is an important topic. In particular, what files should be
used, and what are the real-life scenarios that should be
simulated?
6. Conclusions
The Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance was introduced to
address problems in malware classification, but we have
shown that it has significant utility as a similarity digest for
digital forensic applications. Compared to existing tools,
such as sdhash, LZJD offers a non-heuristic score that can
be interpreted by the user as the amount of byte similarity
between two files. Beyond this property, LZJD is more
robust in its ability to match file fragments to their source,
even when forced to match a fragment on the order of
1% of the original file’s size. We have also shown that
LZJD can be made practical from a speed perspective,
with digest comparison over 60 times faster than sdhash’s,
and hashing time 34% faster. This will allow the use of
larger search databases than is possible with other tools,
while also being more accurate. In the interest of tool
adoption, we have released an open-source implementation
that mimics sdhash’s command line options. This should
allow LZJD to be easily integrated with existing work-flows
for fast adoption by practitioners.
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Appendix A. Full FRASH Results
Here in the appendix we provide more complete results
from the FRASH tests for those who are interested. In
these full tables, Score is the average score for each match,
and Matches or Match it the absolute number of matches
at that size.
Appendix A.1. Single Common Block Tables
In these tables, we show the average block size per-
centage as the Size column. The associated average block
size can be computed from these tables by multiplying the
total block size of the table, with the percentage given in
each column. The SCB tests were run for 50 trials each.
This covers the results in Table A.15, Table A.16, and
Table A.17.
Table A.15. Complete Single Common Block results for a total
block size of 512 KB.
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Score Size (%) Matches Size (%) Matches Size (%) Matches
≥65 48.44 2 — — — —
≥60 47.54 14 — — — —
≥55 43.59 20 — — — —
≥50 42.63 39 — — — —
≥45 38.78 44 48.96 6 — —
≥40 32.42 48 46.61 12 — —
≥35 26.45 43 42.38 16 — —
≥30 22.94 41 40.85 28 — —
≥25 18.42 28 36.13 32 44.15 39
≥20 20.62 5 31.33 37 15.75 50
≥15 — — 27.27 44 3.25 50
≥10 — — 20.88 50 — —
≥5 — — 10.88 50 — —
0 15.5 50 3.12 50 — —
Table A.16. Complete Single Common Block results for a total
block size of 2 MB.
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Score Size (%) Matches Size (%) Matches Size (%) Matches
≥70 44.92 2 — — — —
≥65 44.82 8 — — — —
≥60 43.36 12 — — — —
≥55 42.86 28 — — — —
≥50 40.28 41 — — — —
≥45 37.27 48 47.27 4 — —
≥40 30.05 49 46.03 12 — —
≥35 25.98 48 42.68 19 — —
≥30 21.54 46 39.84 27 — —
≥25 18.85 23 35.66 34 — —
≥20 19.98 7 31.38 42 — —
≥15 — — 24.47 44 42.39 46
≥10 — — 18.72 50 18.38 50
≥5 — — 9.17 50 0.78 50
0 19.17 50 0.88 50 — —
Table A.17. Complete Single Common Block results for a total
block size of 8 MB.
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Score Size (%) Matches Size (%) Matches Size (%) Matches
≥70 44.92 1 — — — —
≥65 46.7 8 — — — —
≥60 45.81 20 — — — —
≥55 42.55 31 — — — —
≥50 39.05 40 49.9 2 — —
≥45 35.83 48 47.01 7 — —
≥40 28.52 50 43.86 13 — —
≥35 23.74 49 41.94 22 — —
≥30 20.07 50 37.3 25 — —
≥25 18.46 36 33.41 31 — —
≥20 16.41 9 28.36 35 49.02 1
≥15 12.89 1 26.47 44 36.56 50
≥10 — — 19.75 50 6.8 50
≥5 — — 9.51 50 0.2 50
0 17.61 50 0.99 50 — —
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Appendix A.2. Random Noise Table
The full results from the random noise test are given
in Table A.18. The Change column is the average percent
of bytes in the filed that needed to be edited for a score
of that value to be obtained, and Match is the number of
files that FRASH was able to successfully reduce to the
given score range. The most robust method for each score
is shown in bold. The default spacing used in FRASH is
10, but we reduced the spacing to 5 to take advantage of
LZJD’s performance of LZJD. The high resitance of LZJD
meant that a zero value was never produced, which did not
interact well with FRASH’s execution. The second to last
row shows that for 7 of the 100 files, a match score in the
range of [1, 5) was produced by modifying an average of
32% of the file. This value is artificially low, as almost all
tests were stopped prematurely before LZJD even reached
a score of 15.
Table A.18. Random Noise Test.
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Score Change (%) Match Change (%) Match Change (%) Match
≥95 0.00058 100 0.01293 84 0.00151 60
≥90 0.00136 99 0.02655 90 0.00317 46
≥85 0.00211 99 0.04710 91 0.00490 55
≥80 0.00291 99 0.06560 93 0.00777 59
≥75 0.00398 93 0.09060 95 0.01243 65
≥70 0.00524 88 0.10677 96 0.02378 75
≥65 0.00814 73 0.13483 97 0.07260 86
≥60 0.01214 51 0.17455 97 0.16215 95
≥55 0.01676 30 0.22571 96 0.36321 95
≥50 0.02057 18 0.27750 99 0.60610 96
≥45 0.04409 10 0.32868 100 1.14643 99
≥40 0.06148 7 0.39398 100 1.96722 99
≥35 0.04466 3 0.45643 100 3.44188 100
≥30 0.05740 2 0.54923 100 6.22476 100
≥25 — — 0.62586 99 10.99275 100
≥20 — — 0.69417 99 18.03654 100
≥15 — — 0.84723 98 30.56353 90
≥10 — — 0.97390 99 48.63043 77
≥5 — — 1.14414 100 63.80973 57
[1, 5) — — — — 32.03773 7
0 0.01283 100 1.55763 100 — —
The change and match values in this table are also
shown in Figure A.3, which plots the number of files
matched against the the percentage of the file changed.
Note that the x-axis is on a log-scale. This score can go
up and down because it is based on the number of files
matched receiving a minimum score (i.e., a score ≥ 90).
Because of this interpretation of the figure must be done
carefully, and emphasize that this figure is to demonstrate
the range of byte alterations each method can withstand.
In this light is becomes clear that ssdeep is only able to
produce matches when very little of the file has been al-
tered, less than 0.1%. Sdhash is able to perform matches
in a range up to 1.1% of the file being randomly altered,
but fails to produce any matches past this point. LZJD in
contrast is able to suffer from as much as 63% of the file
being randomly altered, and still over half the files. It is the
only method to cover this large of a range in the amount
of bytes that can be altered. Again, we note that the lower
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Figure A.3. Random Noise results, plotted for each method
showing how much of the file can be changed while still obtaining
a correct match.
number of matches obtained by LZJD and sdhash in the
left-most portion of the plot are because the associated
minimum score is not factored in. For example, the 60
matches of LZJD at 0.002% is not indicating that only 60
of the files could be matched after that percentage of files
changed. It’s value is 60 because only 60 files could be
matched and obtain a similarity score ≥ 95.
Appendix A.3. Fragment Test Tables
Tables Table A.19 and Table A.20 are the complete
version of Table 11 and Table 12 respectively. The Size
column is the percent file size. We can see that when LZJD
and Sdhash don’t get every match, LZJD always has more
matches. It is also more clear that Sdhash’s performance
degrades at around 5% and drops quickly, where LZJD is
more robust in being able to still hit matches.
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Table A.19. Fragment detection test result (cut side: random
start, then alternating). Matches gives the
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Size Score Matches Score Matches Score Matches
95 96.7 4454 83.4 4457 72.4 4457
90 92.3 4452 70.1 4457 49.2 4457
85 89.5 4442 69.9 4457 45.5 4457
80 86.5 4433 69.1 4457 41.9 4457
75 83.5 4417 68.3 4457 38.8 4457
70 80.1 4403 68.0 4457 35.7 4457
65 76.7 4367 68.4 4457 32.9 4457
60 73.2 4321 68.4 4457 30.1 4457
55 69.7 4205 68.0 4457 27.5 4457
50 65.9 4071 68.5 4457 24.9 4457
45 62.4 3699 69.2 4457 22.4 4457
40 58.6 3140 69.8 4457 20.1 4457
35 54.7 2477 71.0 4457 17.8 4457
30 51.2 1704 71.4 4457 15.5 4457
25 47.9 928 72.2 4456 13.2 4456
20 45.7 411 73.1 4453 11.0 4456
15 43.7 132 73.9 4450 8.8 4456
10 46.2 29 75.7 4371 6.4 4456
5 61.0 2 77.4 4036 3.9 4454
4 — — 78.4 3838 3.3 4444
3 — — 78.7 3616 2.7 4432
2 — — 79.1 3257 2.0 4419
1 — — 81.0 2581 1.3 4390
Table A.20. Fragment detection test result Fragment detection
test result (cut side: right (end only), 5 %). Matches gives the
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Size Score Matches Score Matches Score Matches
95 97.70 4457 97.28 4457 92.80 4457
90 95.90 4456 98.17 4457 85.96 4457
85 93.81 4453 98.86 4457 79.33 4457
80 91.42 4444 99.32 4457 72.99 4457
75 88.85 4440 99.37 4457 66.87 4457
70 85.92 4429 99.44 4457 61.01 4457
65 82.79 4414 99.49 4457 55.39 4457
60 79.36 4378 99.46 4457 50.08 4457
55 75.68 4307 99.49 4457 44.98 4457
50 71.73 4148 99.51 4457 40.06 4457
45 68.01 3815 99.41 4457 35.46 4457
40 64.39 3326 99.37 4457 31.11 4457
35 61.15 2697 99.28 4457 26.97 4457
30 58.26 1968 99.20 4457 23.00 4457
25 56.76 1191 99.07 4457 19.21 4457
20 55.35 632 98.83 4457 15.54 4457
15 53.21 289 98.46 4457 11.94 4457
10 56.90 77 97.88 4380 8.33 4457
5 55.68 22 96.93 4061 4.63 4457
4 59.00 12 96.40 3896 3.88 4457
3 47.89 9 95.04 3678 3.09 4457
2 66.00 2 93.09 3304 2.23 4456
1 — — 90.50 2617 1.36 4442
Appendix A.4. Alignment Table Results
In Table A.21 we provide the alignment results for
adding ≤64 KB to the query file. This is the easier range
of the test, and we can see that both sdhash and LZJD
successfully match all files regardless of added bytes.
Table A.21. Alignment test result (fixed size, step size = 4 KB,
max size = 64 KB)
ssdeep sdhash LZJD
Added (KB) Score Matches Score Matches Score Matches
4 91.31 4439 51.30 4457 42.38 4457
8 87.07 4279 78.51 4457 36.28 4457
12 84.39 4120 65.57 4457 32.60 4457
16 82.76 3901 64.22 4457 30.01 4457
20 82.19 3690 80.50 4457 28.04 4457
24 81.21 3580 51.58 4457 26.50 4457
28 79.98 3465 90.36 4457 25.20 4457
32 79.41 3314 52.38 4457 24.13 4457
36 79.49 3154 78.37 4457 23.21 4457
40 79.15 3059 65.83 4457 22.39 4457
44 79.34 2949 64.25 4457 21.65 4457
48 78.67 2895 80.62 4457 21.02 4457
52 78.03 2839 52.48 4457 20.40 4457
56 77.41 2775 88.19 4457 19.88 4457
60 76.65 2721 53.60 4457 19.39 4457
64 76.27 2645 78.05 4457 18.95 4457
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